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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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now in the hands of this new organisation. Thus yet another puppet
brought into being by the Kremlin's fertile imagination, came to life over
the Moscow radio.

The experience gained in the Civil War, which lasted from 1917 to 1921
in Russia, and which terminated for the Moscow leaders only with the
re-annexation of Georgia in 1923,, exercised an influence over the Soviet's
preparations for a future war. This experience taught them that the
easiest way to crush an opponent's armies was to attack them on the flank,
and disintegrate them by propaganda in the rear. In the 1919-1920 war
against Poland, this type of attack on the morale of the opponent had not
given the slightest success to the Bolsheviks. The Polish war was.,
however, only one episode in that great and extremely bloody struggle
which raged for so many years throughout Russia, and so it was classified
merely as c the exception which proves the rule.'
Tukhachevski, Commander of the armies attacking Poland in 1920,
imbued with the theory of the c battle in the rear of the enemy' and
 class-warfare/ and adhering closely to his wishful thinking, did not
observe the peculiarity of this Polish war, namely, that to the Poles
defending their own land, it was a national war, and he was to bring his
account of the campaign against Poland to the obviously incorrect con-
clusion that,
" no national slogan could dim the essentials of this class-warfare which
was being fought ... It is beyond question that, had we been able to tear
the Polish Army from the hands of the Polish bourgeoisie, the revolution
of the worker-class in that country would have been an accomplished fact.
The subsequent conflagration would not have been limited to the walls of
Poland, but as an untamed torrent it would have swept through western
Europe . . . The Red Army will not forget this experience. And if and
when the European bourgeoisie will challenge us to fight, the Red Army
will be able to defeat it, and to support and spread the revolution throughout
Although Lenin was of a different opinion and had rightly assessed the
idea of class-warfare in connection with Poland to be valueless, neverthe-
less this idea of' war in the rear of the enemy ' was to become one of the
essential features of the Soviet war doctrine. At first all hopes were
exclusively directed towards the effect of this action on the morale of the
enemy, but as time went on and the prospects of revolution in Europe
faded, the main Russian effort in the preparation for this warfare was
shifted from the moral to the material factors. The subsequent result
was the tremendous development of the paratroops in Russia. Airborne
regiments, trained in the Red Army camps, seemed a safer instrument for
effective use than the most efficient Cominimist Party organised in the
enemy's hinterland.